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Abstract 
Gennany has recently witnessed a vast increase in anti-foreign violence. Assembling data from a wide variety of 
recent research, the paper addresses two basic questions: to what extent is the outburst of xenophobic attacks a 
German peculiarity? and what are the explanations for the mcreasing violence? An analysis of criminal statistics 
of various European countries and of comparative opinion polls in the European Community shows that Germany 
has indeed witnessed a growth of anti-foreign sentiment, and a level of violence that is conspicuous from a com­
parative perspective. Four possible determinants of this peculiarity of recent German history are discussed: (1) the 
growing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity due to the vast increase in immigration from non-European countries; 
(2) the increasing costs of foreigners' claims on the German welfare state; (3) the economic context of immigration; 
and (4) the transformation of national identity in the context of German unification. It is shown that neither the 
rate of immigration nor the position of foreigners in the German welfare state yields satisfactory explanations for 
the recent upsurge in violence, which only occurred after unification. The key for an explanation lies in a particu­
lar macro-constellation that is characterized by the concurrence of a massive wave of immigration with an 
economic crisis, and with the ethnicization of German national identity in the context of unification. Anti-foreign 
sentiments do not automatically follow increases in immigration, but grow in a specific political climate to which 
the political elites actively contribute. 
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TOWARDS BXPLAINING ANTI-FOREIGN VIOLENCB IN GERMANY 
Jens Alber, Universitat Konstanz 
Introduction 
Germany presently presents a rather confusing and ambivalent 
picture to the world. On the one hand, since the German unifi­
cation hardly a day has passed without an outburst of anti-fo­
reign violence. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of 
German citizens rallied in demonstrations against anti-foreign 
violence, German newspapers were filled with ads expressing 
solidarity with foreign residents, and, in almost every town, 
associations spring forth that seek to promote the integration 
of foreigners. 
Attempts to explain the explosion of anti-foreign violence in 
recent yea~s are just as multifaceted as the presentation of the 
country in everyday life. On the micro as well as on the macro 
level we find diametrically opposed hypotheses. One explanation 
prominent on the micro level'is that the increasing readiness to 
resort to violence is the result of the permissiveness of pa­
rents of the 68er generation who failed to draw limits for their 
children and to perform the social control functions required by 
adults in the socialization process. On the other side, there 
are explanations in the tradition of the "Authoritarian Persona­
lity", according to which the emotional deprivation suffered by 
children in too repressive families is a major cause of the 
upsurge in right wing violence. 
On the macro level, there are similarly contradictory ideas. On 
the one hand, we have hypotheses which view anti-foreign vio­
lence as a sort of collective self-defense against an excessive 
immigration of asylum seekers and an exploitation of the German 
welfare state by foreigners. On the other hand, there are hypo­
theses which highlight the problematic German national identity 
as the root of the problem. Thus, several politicians and intel­
lectuals champion the idea that . the wave of anti-foreign vio­
lence is the result of a too heavy tabooing of national pride. 
By overstressing cosmopolitan values, the political establish­
ment of the Federal Republic has left it exclusively to right 
wing radicals to satisfy the neglected desire for national pride 
and identity. As rebellious adolescents try to challenge the 
established adult world by transgressing taboos, and as German 
nationalism has become more or less the only taboo left in an 
otherwise permissive society, the adolescent rebellion against 
the established insider culture articulates itself in a new 
radical nationalism. If this may be called the ·vacuum hypothe­
sis" of national identity, there is also a rival hypothesis 
which sees the recent violence as the result of an excessive 
mobilization of national consciousness after German unification, 
and of a fading of cosmopolitan, pluralist political orien­
tations. From the latter perspective, not the neglect of, but 
rather the overemphasis .on national identity, is the root cause 
of the recent outbursts of right wing violence. 
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In ~ op~n~on it is the task of social science to narrow the 
margin of possible interpretations by systematically confronting 
such conjectures with empirical data. Hence I will try to 
summarize and re-evaluate the available empirical evidence ih 
the light of competing theoretical explanations. As I am' a 
sociologist rather th~n a psychologist, I will concentrate on 
explanations on the macro level. 
The two rival hypotheses on national identity -, the vacuum 
hypothesis and the moblization thesis - have one aspect ,in 
common. Both imply the idea that the upsurge of anti-foreign 
violence is a specifically German problem which is rooted in the 
peculiarities of German history. I will test this idea by exa­
mining first whether Germany is more xenophobic than other 
European countries. This will serve to, specify the dependent 
variable of the analysis. Then I will move to a discussion of 
four explanatory variables that figure more or less prominently 
in current public debates. First I will test two popular hypo­
theses ~hat view the wave of anti-foreign violence as a sort of 
collective self-defense against (1) foreign exploitation of the 
German welfare state, or (2) against a wave of immigration which 
has moved beyond tolerable' limits. Then I will discuss two 
further determinants, i.e. (3) the economic context of the re­
cent immigration, and (4) th-e mobilization of a specific kind of 
national consciousness in the context of German unification. 
My hypothesis will be that neither the rate of immigration nor 
the position of foreigners in the German welfare state yield 
satisfactory explanations for the recent upsurge in anti-foreign 
violence. The key for an explanation lies rather in a particular 
macro constellation that is characterized by the concurrence of 
a wave of migration with an economic crisis, and with the ethni­
zation of Ge~an national identity in the context of unifica­
tion. As I see the prime task of social science less in develo­
ping speculations than in testing hypotheses, I will add a final 
section in which I discuss how this idea and the rival vacuum­
of-national-idehtity-hypothesis could be empirically tested. 
1. The dependent variable: Are Germans more xenophobic than 
others? 
There are two ways by which to approach an empirical answer to 
the question whether the level of xenophobia is exceptional in 
Germany. First we can-take a look at the criminal statistics of 
various countries in order to measure the incidence of anti-fo­
reign violence. Secondly, we can turn to the comparative opinion 
polls of the European Communities in order to see if anti-fo­
reign sentiments prevail in Germany to a stronger degree than 
elsewhere in Europe. 
a} Anti-foreign violence in a comparative perspective 
As there is no comparative source on anti-foreign violence, I 
have written to a number of European embassies in order to 
obtain their national data. Data were supplied by the govern-. 
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ments of France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 
addition some comparative newspaper accounts could be utilized. 
According to these data" only Great Britain has witnessed an 
increase in anti-foreign violence that is comparable to Germany. 
Between 1988 and 1991, the number of instances of racial assault 
and racial harassment almost doubled in Britain from 4,383 to 
7,882. In 1992 7,793 incidents with a racist motivation were 
registered (Horne Office Fax of 9/12/1993). In the first ten 
months of 1993 12 deaths were attributed to violence with a 
racist background (International Herald Tribune November 3, 
1993: 4). In France, anti-foreign violence reached a climax on 
a much lower level during the mid-1980s, but has been declining 
since. Between 1980 and 1992, a, total of 641 criminal anti­
foreign activities were registered in which 1,652 persons became 
the victims of racist threats. 25 fatal incidents occurred from 
1980 to 1992, non qf which happened in the two most recent years 
(Consulat General de France, letter of 28/10/1993). Germany 
registered some twenty fatal incidents in the year of 1992 
alone .1 
Switzerland counted 34 anti-,foreign violent acts in 1990 and 81 
in 1991, including one fatal'incident (Schweizerischer Bundesrat 
1992: 33). sweden registered 25 acts of anti-foreign arson or 
explosive attacks in 1992, but no deaths. In the same year the 
,country hosted some 83,000 asylum seekers (Swedish Embassy Fax 
of 16/9/1993; see also Steinke 1993) .In Germany the number of 
violent acts committed by right wing extremists increased from 
270 in 1990 to 1,483 in 1991, and to 2,584 in 1992 (see table 
1). The German authorities also give data on the. number of 
attacks with explosive devices or arson which are roughly 
comparable to the Swedish data. In 1992, there were 722 such 
attacks (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993: 70). If this is 
compared to the 25 attacks in Sweden, it becomes clear that with 
a population size 9.4 times larger than the Swedish one, the 
Federal Republic accepted 5.3 times as many asylum seekers as 
Sweden, but experienced 29 times as many acts of anti-foreign 
arson. 
In sum, Germany is not the only European country to experience 
increasing anti-foreign violence in recent years, but the number 
and the intensity of these acts seems to be higher than else­
where in Europe. Data from comparative poll's also confirm that· 
there is a remarkable degree of xenophobia in Germany. 
1 In a very .detailed account of each individual act the 
periodocal DIE WOCHE (No 24/1993) arrives at a total number of 
26 deaths whereas the government's Verfassungsschutzbericht for 
1992 states the numb~r of deaths in a summary account as 17 
(Bundesministerium des Innern 1993: 70). 
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b) Attitudes on foreismers in comparative opinion polls' 
The 1992 Burobarometer carried out by the Commission of the 
European Communities contained several items measuring anti­
foreign attitudes. In none of these items does Germany rank as 
the country with the highest degree of intolerance. In contrast 
to other nations, however, she consistently appears among the 2­
4 countries with the highest proportion of xenophobic state­
ments . Thus Germany has above average proportions of people 
saying that there are too many foreigners in their country, 'that 
the presence of foreigners is disturbing, that the rights of 
foreigners should be restricted rather than extended, or that 
asylum seekers should no longer be accepted. If a compound index 
of xenophobia is constructed from the various items, only the 
Belgians stood out as as equally hostile to foreigners in 1992 
as the Germans (Wiegand 1993: 4 i Kommission der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften 1992) . 
By and large, we may conclude, then, that Germany is not unique 
in experiencing increasing xenophobia in recent years, but that 
the level of anti-foreign attitudes and of anti-foreign violence 
is conspicuously high in a. comparative European perspective: 
This requires explanation. 
2. possible explanations 
2.1 The position of foreigners in the German welfare state 
Right wing radicals·see asylum seekers and other foreigners as 
menacing competitors who not only take away jobs in the labor 
market, but also exploit the German wel.fare state by an exces­
sive claim of benefits. The authors ofa study on anti-foreign 
violence which was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Women 
and Youth summarized this position as follows: "It is not a set 
of shared ideologies or political convictions that serves as a 
bond between the heterogeneous groups of violent actors but 
rather a diffuse sense of general deprivation of Germans vis-a­
vis foreigners, especially asylum seekers. This perception is 
above all connected to problems of housing and of social 
transfer payments for asylum seekers" (Willems/ Wurtz/ Ec~ert 
1993: 132; translation from the German original by this author). 
Since the idea that foreigners are parasites who exploit the 
German taxpayer serves as a legitimizing bridge that helps to 
redefine anti-foreign violence as legitimate self-defense, I 
will examine briefly to what extent foreigners indeed overburden 
the German welfare state. 
As in all legends, there is a grain of truth in the right wing 
view. It' is true that foreigners are increasingly overrepre­
sented among the recipients of social assistance, which is the 
German form of poor relief. From 1980 to 1990 the proportion of 
foreigners among social assis~ance recipients increased from 8 
to 22 ~ (8eck 1992; 300). Only 6 t of all Germans, Dut 16 % of 
the foreign residents draw social assistance benefits. This may 
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be seen as a basis for the growing resentment. However I the 
social assistance scheme is only a minor program, representing 
merely 5 % of the Federal Republic's social expenditure. The 
bulk of social outlays goes to the pension insurance system,
where foreigners account for roughly 8 % of the income from 
contributions ,while .drawing only 2 % of the outlays for 
benefits (Rehfeld 1991: 491). 
The aggregate impact that foreigners have on the German tax and 
transfer system was recently examined by one of the country's
leading economic research institutes. It came to the conclusion 
that foreigners paid around 30 billion DM in taxes and social 
insurance contributioris in 1991, while receiving transfers worth 
16 billion DM. In other words, the presence of foreigners 
amounts to a fiscal gain of 14 billion DM per year (Barabas et 
al 1992: 145). Hence foreigners actually unburden the German 
welfare state. Thus there is no empirical basis for interpreting" 
anti-foreign violence as an economically rational act of -self­
defense against an exploitation of the welfare state. Let us now 
examine to what extent anti-foreign activities can be seen as an 
act of self-defense against excessive immigration. 
2.2 The increasing pressures from immigration 
Following the official view frequently expressed by German 
politicians, Germans have friendly feelings toward foreigners,
but their basically positive attitude became recently over­
strained by an excessive wave of immigration, as Germany
accepted more asylum seekers in 1992 than all other EC-countries 
together. From this perspective, anti-foreign violence is the 
inevitable consequence of an overflooding wave of immigration,
which must be broken if domestic peace is to be restored. 
It is certainly correct that Germany is one of the most densely 
populated countries in Europe. It is also correct that this 
densely populated country witnessed a"massive wave of immigra­
tion in recent years with conspicuously high numbers of asylum 
seekers (see'table 1). Since 1961 the proportion of foreigners 
has risen from 1.2 to over 8 %. Moreover, the structure of the 
foreign resident population has changed significantly. Most of 
the immigrants now come from non-European countries so that the 
ethnic and cultural heterogeneity of the population has rapidly
increased. Within the European Community, Germany ranks third 
after Luxembourg and Belgium with respect to the proportion of 
resident foreigners, but by far first with respect to the pro­
portion of foreigners from non-EC countries (presently roughly
6 % - see Fuchs/Gerhards/Roller 1993: 248), 
If we analyze the Eurobarometer data on anti-foreign sentiments, 
it becomes evident" that the frequency of xenophobic sentiments 
is highly correlated with the proportion of foreigners in the 
country '" The more foreigners there are, the more fr~quent are 
anti-foreign attitudes, This pattern shows up consistently
regardless of whether we ask for evaluations of the presence of 
foreigners or for opinions concerning their rights as citizens 
(see" graphs 1-5). 
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In none of these analyses does Germany appear as an outlier 
which deviates from the general pattern. On the contrary, the 
country is to be found below the regression 'line which indicates 
the statistically normal relationship between the presence of 
immigrants and xenophobic sentiments. In other words, xenophobic
atti tudes are less marked in Germany than one would expect, 
given the statistics on the proportion of foreign residents. The 
data thus seem to support the hypothesis of German politicians 
that Germans nourish friendly feelings toward foreigners and 
that the dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers which 
occurred in the 1990s is the root cause of current anti-foreign 
activities. 
Al though this interpretation may be' viewed as the consensus 
opinion shared by politicians and most social scientists in 
Germany alike, I think that it is flawed in several respects. 
First, opinion poll data on attitudes' must not be confounded 
with the frequency of anti-foreign violence. Secondly, an ana­
lysis of tqe available empirical evidence from a comparative and 
a longitudinal perspective shows that such an interpretation 
would not be in line with the facts./ 
A comparison with Sweden shows that immigration alone cannot be 
interpreted as a sufficient cause of anti-foreign violence. With 
a population of 8.5 million, Sweden, accepted 83,200 asylum 
'seekers in 1992 (The Swedish Institute 1993: 2; see also Sud­
deutsche Zeitung 40/1993: 7). In proportion to its population 
size, it thus accepted twice as many asylum seekers as the Fede­
ral Republic. Yet, as was shown above, the level of violence in 
Sweden remained much lower, and without any death toll so far. 
A longitudinal analysis of the association petween the influx of 
asylum seekers and anti-foreign violent acts2 in Germany during 
the past decades is even more striking. Generally speaking, it 
is true that the absolute number of violent acts increased as 
the number of foreign immigrants rose. However, there is a 
phase-specific pattern. Throughout the 1980s there has not been 
any strong statistical association between the two developments. 
From 1983 to 1990 the number of asylum seekers increased ten­
fold, while the number of right wing violent acts only rose 
moderately from 67 to 128 incidents per year (see table 1 and 
graph 6). Only after the unification did a sudden explosion of 
right wing violence occur. Within one year, the number of vio­
lent acts in the united Germany jumped from 270 in 1990' to L 483 
in 1991, while the number of asylum seekers merely increased by 
33 %. 
The argument that increasing immigration leads to growing anti­
foreign ,violence may 'have two different meanings. First, it 
2 The official 'report on anti-constitutional activities 
(Verfassungsschutzbericht) gives data on violence from right 
wing extremists without drawing a distinction between anti­
foreign and right wing violence (see Bundesministerium des 
Innern 1993: 68-70). 
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could mean that there is a constant relationship between the 
number of foreigners and the degree of anti-foreign hostility. 
This would imply that violence only increases in absolute terms, 
because there is growing opportunity to express hostility, as 
the growing number of foreigners or asylum seekers increases the 
number of potential targets. Secondly, the argument could mean, 
however, that the growing presence of foreigners actually leads 
to an increasing intensity of anti-foreign aggression so that 
there are not only more violent acts in absolute terms but also 
in relative terms. If we take the changing number of potential 
victims into account by calculating the ratio of violent acts 
per 1,000 asylum seekers, the first version of the argument 
would imply a constant ratio of right wing violence over time, 
whilst the second'version would predict the ratio to increase as 
the number of asylum seekers grows. 
In actual fact, the ratio of anti-foreign violence increased 
only.briefly in the context of the government turnover from the 
social democrats to the christian union in 1982/83, but declined 
in subsequent years during the 1980s despite a growing influx of 
foreigners (graph 7). Throughout the 1980s there was even a ne­
gative relationship between the influx of asylum seekers and the 
ratio of right wing violence (graph 8). After the unification, 
the ratio of right. wing violent acts then suddenly increased 
from 1.4 to 5.8 per 1,000 potential victims. As anti-foreign 
violence grew vastly out of proportion to changes in immigration 
after the unification, it follows that migration data alone 
cannot account for the sudden increase in right wing radicalism 
in tpe united Germany. Other explanatory factors also need to be 
considered. 
2.3 The economic context of immigration 
The mere number of foreign residents says only very little about 
the potential of anti-foreign violence. Only in the context of 
crises do foreigners and other minorities typically become the 
target of violent acts. This may be related to more and less 
rational considerations or motives. Economic rationalism teaches 
us that, in the context of economic downturns, distributional 
conflicts assume the character of zero sum games, in which one 
group can only get what another group loses. In such situations, 
social transfers for foreigners also have growing opportunity 
costs for natives, so that the competition for shares in the 
budget becomes fierce~. 
There is also a more irrational aspect related t·o crises, how­
ever. Crises usually give rise to a search for scapegoats. In 
his history of the Jews, Abba Eban (1970) pointed out that the 
rights of minorities have always been threatened when economic 
or national crises break forth. In his Studies on Germany (MStu­
dien Uber die DeutschenM -1990), Norbert Elias developed the 
argument that men strive for the control of events, and that in 
the presence of crises and the absence of rational knowledge 
acout theit" complex Cguses, they gre prone to turn to magic 
rather than rational mechanisms of ·control. Similarly, Max Weber. 
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stated that charismatic leadership typically presupposes a 
charismatic situation in the sense of an extraordinary crisis 
that creates a demand for miraculous capacities which promise to 
release people from the emergency (Weber 1980). In sum, only the 
challenge of crises creates chances for political seducers who 
offer simple answers to complex problems . 
. Now it is important to realize that the massive influx of fo­
reigners combined in several respects with crisis tendencies in 
Germany. First~ it coincided with an economic recession and a 
concomitant crisis of the welfare state. Secondly, it combined 
with a crisis of German identity in the context of the unifi­
cation. . 
The increasing immigration met with a very tense labor. market 
situation in Germany. For several years the German economy has 
had difficulties in creating an adequate supply of jobs to meet 
the growing demand. Departing from an already high level, the 
unemployment rate increased sizeably after the unification. 
Roughly one third of those who ·are currently unemployed have 
been out of work for more than one year (Bundesministerium fur 
Arbeit and Sozialordnung 199·1: 75)'. 
The adverse labour market conditions entail massive processes of 
downward mobility. Empirically, these manifest themselves in the 
growing indebtedness of private households, and in the changing 
structure of poverty. The proportion of private households in 
serious debt is now estimated at 5 % (Korczak 1992: 112/113;
Suddeutsche Zeiturig 110/1993: 48). Poverty increasingly threa­
tens also economically active .categories. According to recent 
poverty research, over one quarter of all private households 
fall at least temporarily under the poverty threshold during a 
period of five years (Habich/Headey/Krause 1991; .Krause 1992). 
Today it is no longer the elderly, but younger cohorts who face 
overproportionate poverty risks. ·Amongst people aged 18-25 the 
ratio of registered poverty has increased sixfold since 1970. 
Whereas in 1970 only every hundredth younger person had to 
resort to poor relief, now every sixteenth lives on public 
assistance (Deininger 1983: 506; Statistisches Bundesamt 1992a: 
504). Various indicators suggest that the abandonment of demo­
cratic procedures and of civil forms of behavior is heavily 
concentrated in these increasingly impoverished younger cohorts. 
The degree to which political alienation is associated with 
social downgrading processes is first revealed by electoral 
statistics. In federal elections voter turnout amongst those 
aged 18-25 decreased by some 20 percentage points between 1972 
and 1990 {Mayer 1991: 252}. In the most recent federal election 
(1990), the right wing Republicans polled only 2.1% of the votes 
on aggregate, but 5.2 % among men below age 25 (Mayer 1991:.. 
256). Younger age cohorts are heavily overrepresented amongst 
Republican voters. This is especially true in the new eastern 
territories. Thus the Republicans scored their best election 
result - 7 % - among male East German voters below age 25 (Mayer 
1991: 257). 
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Opinion polls confirm the social concentration of right wing 
extremism among younger men and in the eastern territories (see 
e.g. Roth 1989). In January 1993. 5 % of West German adults, 
but 8 % of East Germans expressed an understanding for anti-fo­
reign violence (ipos 1993: 81). The highest degree of approval ­
24 % - was found among young East Germans with little schooling 
(ipos 1993: 82). 
These findings fit well with the sociology of stratification and 
mobility which has always suggested that downward mobility 
favors extremist nationalism. According to this' sociological 
research, people in stratified societies tend to develop con­
cepts of the social order which allow them to uphold a positive 
self image (Zetterberg 1957: 184). Thus members of the lower 
clas'ses tend to cultivate concepts of social stratification that 
allow them to consider themselves as belonging to superior cate­
gories. Hence. they frequently adhere to ethnic or moral cate­
gorizations of the social order that make it possible to define 
other groups as socially inferior. Sociologists have called this 
tendency IIstatus COSDt.etiqs" (Mayer 1975: 92). Following this 
sociological concept, I would argue that the downward mobility 
experienced by young Germans· in recent years favors the mobili~ 
zation of ethnic classifications which enhance the distinction 
between Germans and foreigners while emphasizing the superiority 
of Germans. This allows the economically disadvantaged groups to 
bolster a positive self-image. 
The tendency.to mobilize an ethnic concept of national identity
is further strengthened by the massive migration movements from 
Eastern to Western Europe and from the South to the North. These 
have led to increasing competition in the labour market where 
the underqualified lower classes now face growing numbers of 
foreign competitors. This fiercer competition for jobs also 
fuels nationalistic resentments. Thus. the most recent study of 
German youth has shown that the reje9tion of foreigners among 
young East Germans increases with the degree to which they per­
ceive their jobs to be threatened (Jugendwerk der Deutschen 
Shell 1992: 58). 
The German unification considerably intensified the problems in 
the economy and in the labor market. In addition, it also 
spurred a crisis in German national ,identity. 
2.4 'l'he transformation of German national identity in the 
context of unification 
In contrast to England or,France, Germany did not experience the 
formation of nation states within stable territorial borders 
prior to the social mobilization of the masses. This belated 
nation-building had manifold' consequences. While the' French 
Revolution conceptualized the nation as a political bond amongst
free people subject to the same laws and represented by the same 
national assembly, the Germans thought of the nation as a natu­
ral bond amongst people of the same ethnic extraction (Neumann 
1977: 135/137). Thus the concept of the nation denoted not only 
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a political bond ( u Staatsnation a ) but also a cultural bond 
(UKulturnation"). According to the sociologist Rainer Lepsiu5 
this fusion of various facets of national 'identity implied an 
ethnization of the concept of the nation-state and a politi­
cization of the concept of national culture (Lepsius/Ludzl 
Scholz 1974: 68). Lepsius also argues that political elites may 
emphasize different dimensions of national,identity to varying 
degrees depending on what kind of political unity they consider 
des,irable in a given historical situation (Ibid.: 69). Picking 
up this idea, I would argue that during the Cold War the Federal 
Republic emphasized the concept of the nation as a political 
unit in order to stress the difference to the GDR, while the 
crumbling of the GDR led to the mobilization of 'the concept of 
the nation as an ethnic and cultural unit. By stressing the 
features that,the two parts of Germany had in common, the em­
phasis on the cultural definition of the nation allowed post­
unification political leaders to bridge the post-war differences 
in eastern and western political traditions . A side-effect of 
this ethnic concept of national identity was, however, that the 
difference between Germans and foreigners became accentuated. 
The transformation of German'national identity was favored by a 
second aspect, which has to do with the mechanism of status 
cosmetics I have described as a means to cope with downward 
mobility. As a consequence of,the unification, the citizens of 
the former GDR mutated from the rich men of Eastern Europe to 
the pauper of the united Germany. Given the marked East-West 
disparities in the country, there was a strong incentive for the 
citizens in the East to downplay their relative deprivation by 
mobilizing the concept of a ,common superiority of all Germans 
over foreigners. Since the old regime had barred them from 
foreign travel and the concomitant contacts with foreign 
cultures, there has been little room for developing cognitive 
dissonances which would impede the development of such con­I 
cepts. 3 
The recent reports of the Ministry of the Interior on anti-­
constitutional activities (Verfassungsschutzberichte) provide 
some interesting empirical findings which are perfectly in line 
with the above interpretation. The most recent report issued in 
1993 pinpointed the fact that anti-foreign violence is overpro­
portionately concentrated in the new eastern territories. Al­
though representing only one fifth of the population, the 
eastern territories registered one third of all violent acts 
with a right wing background (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993: 
70). The preceding 1992 report also revealed that right wing 
violence escalates~at special dates with'a symbolic political 
meaning. While the number of violent acts increased mildly on 
Hitler's birthday, it virtually exploded on the day of German 
unification in October 1991 (Bundesministerium des Innern 1992: 
3 A recent study showed that 15 % of East German adolescents 
Who had travel experience to foreign countries, but 27 % of 
those without foreign travel rejected the id~a of having for~ign 
friends as a matter of principle (ipos 1993: 90). 
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75). Moreover the 1993 report showed that 67 % of all suspects
of anti-foreign violence were under 21 years of age in 1992 and 
that they came predominantly from non-established social 
categories. While pupils, apprentices and unemployed people were 
heavily overrepresented among the suspects, more established 
groups like employees, were heavily underrepresented. A study 
commissioned by the Ministry of Women and Youth con.firmed that 
anti-foreign violence is heavily concentrated in groups with low 
education: 78 % of all suspects had either no or only the lowest 
educational degree (Willems/Wurtz/Eckert 1993: 22). 
How can these findings be put into a broader theoretical per­
spective? I think the work .of the American sociologists of 
delinquent behavior, Sykes and Matza (1957), provides a useful 
clue. Sykes and Matza argue that delinquent acts are not rooted 
in socially closed and homogenous deviant subcultures, but that 
delinquents are rather subject to ambivalent influen'ces of a 
conforming and a deviant nature. In order to justify deviant 
acts, the delinquents therefore need -techniques of neutrali­
zation" that allow them to relate their deeds to norms which 
they perceive as more urgent or more valuable than the norms 
that they violate. In other'words, norm violations are facili­
tated if inhibitions or remorse are successfully neutralized by 
legitimizing bridges that provide justifications for the deviant 
acts. Following Sykes and Matza one crucial neutralization 
technique consists in conceiving of the victim as someone infe­
rior who deserves punishment. The chance to label a victim as 
inferior or as deserving punishment is a function of the social 
distance between him and the perpetrator. Therefore, especially 
socially distant groups become selected as targets of delin~ent 
acts (Sykes/Matza 1957). 
According to the empirical evidence that is presently available, 
anti-foreign violence in Germany was so far only seldomly a 
product of planned, organized actions (Willems/ Wurtz/ Eckert 
1993: 138). Most acts developed spontaneously from contingent 
constellations in which the consumption of alcohol in gangs 
combined with petty private resentments, as well ·as more general 
political prejudice .. Thus the. killers of a Turkish girl in 
Solingen were apparently motivated by the fact that· they had 
been kicked out of a Turkish restaurant. Whether individual 
aggressions will be repressed as illegitimate or else be freely 
expressed, is a· function of the availability of legitimizing 
bridge concepts, which provide a superior justification for 
petty private motives. The mobilization of an ethnicized concept 
of national identity after the German unification, and the per~ 
ceived increase in competition from foreigners in the.economic 
slump, provided bases for techniques of neutralization that 
helped to justify anti-foreign violence as legitimate self-de­
fense. 
If this interpretation is correct, it follows that ant·i-foreign 
violence is less a persisting trait of German culture than a 
transitory phenomenon, which will vanish to the degree that the 
economic problems and the social disintegration processes fol­
lowing the German unification will be overcome. First indica­
I 
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tions of a gradual return to normalcy may be seen in the fact 
that the number of anti-foreign violent acts declined again in 
1993 from 2,584 in the preceding year to'1,814 (see table 1). 
The. question then is what practical policy consequences 'my 
analysis implies~ 
2.5 Summary and policY conclusions 
I have interpreted the upsurge of anti-foreign violence as the 
product of a macro-constellation in which growing pressure from 
migration combined with an economic crisis in the context of 
German unification~ and with a concomitant mobilization of an 
ethnic concept of national identity. Given these major expla­
natory variables, the question then is which of these can be 
successfully controlled by political action. . 
The problem pressure created by international migration and 
economic stagnation is likely to persist because of the wide 
discrepancies in the standard of living of the northern and the 
southern hemisphere as well as between western and eastern Eu­
rope. Despite of the heavy immigration into the Federal Republic 
during the past decades, the official German policy continues to 
be built on the premise that Germany is not an immigration 
country. It now appears necessary to deny reality no longer and 
to channel the influx of immigrants by an immigration law, which 
would define annual quotas that help to define immigration as 
something normal, rather than as a deviation from standard con­
ditions. 
The tensions that are associated with the increasing cultural 
heterogeneity of the population will only pe eased, however, if 
sufficient openings in the labor market can be created which 
lessen the competition for jobs. Although it is presently hard 
to imagine how unemployment may be successfully reduced, demo­
graphic changes will make for a rapidly shrinking labor force 
after the turn of the century. In this new situation, migrant 
workers who contribute to alleviate the pressure on the pension 
insurance scheme will probably be more welcome. 
As long as the problems in the labor market persist, however, it 
will be'necessary to channel the mobilization of national con­
sciousness in a way' that . ~eeps anti-foreign violence within 
limits. This can be done on three levels. The first 'concerns 
symbolic politics. This is where the behavior of political 
elites is important. ,As the values cherished in the political 
center of a society disseminate to the periphery, those who 
occupy the center become a crucial reference group for citizens 
at the margins (Shils 1965). The political elites can mobilize 
or inhibit anti-foreign sentiments. As long as there was little 
pressure from foreign countries or from business circles con­
cerned about the export chances of German products in interna­
tional markets, the political leaders of the Federal Republic 
did little to inhibit the formation of anti-foreign attitudes. 
Not only did they downplay the significance of anti-foreign 
violence, but they also contributed to mobilize anti-foreign 
13 
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sentiments. Thus in september 1991, the former secretary general 
of the CDU, Volker RUhe, wrote a circular to all officeholders 
of the party down to the district level, in which he demanded to 
make the influx of asylum seekers an item on the political 
agenda. In the letter he gave concrete examples of how to mobi­
_lize public concern oyer the alleged overburdening of German 
local authorities (DIE ZEIT 23/1993: 1). After the murder of 
Turkish immigrants in Solingen, Chancellor Kohl deliberately 
decided not to travel to the site of the assault to express his 
solidarity with the victims, but preferred to go to Berlin .in 
order to celebrate the restoration of a monument of German 
history. This attempt to appeal to voters of th.e right wing 
fringes of the party system is in striking contrast with the 
actions taken by French President Mitterrand, who opted to march 
at the head of a demonstration against right wing radicalism 
after an assault on the Jewish minority. In combination with 
determined police actions against right wing radicalism, osten­
tatious acts by political leaders of this kind can serve to en­
hance the de-legitimation of access to violence. 
A second level of possible political action refers to the defi­
ni tion of citizenship. The' Federal Republic is not the only 
country in Europe which links citizenship to ethnic descent. The 
Netherlands also do-that, for example. Moreover, other countries 
like France presently consider shifting from a territorial to an 
ethnic definition of citizenship. Hence, it would be unrealistic 
··to advocate that the Federal Republic now change to a territo­
rial concept. As a compromise between the alternative concepts, 
it would be possible, however" to introduce the possibility of 
a dual citizenship for second generation immigrants. This would 
contribute to reducing the social distance between Germans and 
foreigners and would promote the social integration of foreign­
ers who are ~ow prone to withdraw into their national subcul­
tures. ' 
A third level of political action could consist in extending the 
right to vote in local elections to foreign workers. The crea­
tion of universal suffrage for all residents of a certain 
duration could contribute to overcome the segmenting effects 
that are associated with the ethnic definition of citizenship, 
and could help to narrow the social distance between· Germans and 
foreigners. The experience made in Sweden and the Netherlands 
shows that an extension of local voting rights to foreigners 
does not necessarily have any destabilizing political effects. 
Sweden granted foreigners who have been living in the country 
for at least three years the right to vote in local and regional 
elections already in 1976. 'The Netherlands changed their electo­
4 Of course, citizenship does not only convey rights but 
also obligations. One of the most fundamental obligations tied 
to citizenship is mastering the language of the country one is 
living in. It is difficult to comprehend why the employment of 
foreign workers was not tied to an obligation for workers and 
employers alike to ansura partieipation in language courses of 
an extended duration. 
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ral law in 1985 to extend voting rights in local elections to 
foreigners.who have been residing in the cQuntry for five years. 
In both countries, the concern that foreigners might vote for 
new ethnic parties of a radical type was not substantiated. The 
voting pattern of foreigners actually followed class lines 
rather than ethnic affiliation. Thus, the Turks residing in 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam cas~ 78 and 81 % of their votes for the 
Dutch Workers' Party (Graziani 1992: 79/80). This Dutch example 
shows that the barriers to an extension of voting rights to 
foreigners lie less in concerns over a possible disruption of 
the party system than in the electoral calculus of the estab­
lished parties, who fear that parties of the left might benefit 
from such a change. It is noteworthy, however, that an extension 
of voting rights to foreigners would not be popular among German 
voters. According to the EC-Eurobarometer, only the Danes are 
more opposed to an·extension of voting rights to foreigners than 
the Germans (Wiegand 1993:3). Within Germany, followers of the 
Greens are the only population group where a majority support 
the extension of suffrage to foreigners (Noelle-Neumann/KOcher 
199'3: 529). Politicians advocating such a step would therefore 
have to work hard to persuade the voters. 
3. 	An alternative hypothesis and possible strategies for testing 
who is right 
I had indicated in the introduction that there is a serious 
counter-argument to the ideas' I developed here. According to 
this counter-argument, the explosion of right wing violence is 
not so much an expression of xenophobia or chauvinism as an 
expression of the resentment that adolescents nourish against 
the dominant cosmopolitan culture of the political establish~ 
ment. From this perspective, anti-foreign violence is not the 
result of a mobilization of ethnicized national sentiments, but, 
on the contrary, the consequence of a long-standing suppression 
of national pride. 
This is not merely an acadenUc debate but rather an argument 
which has immediate political repercussions. MY interpretation 
suggests tearing down legitimizing bridges for the justification 
of anti-foreign violence by promoting the social integration of 
foreigners, by expressing solidarity with foreigners, and by 
tabooing chauvinism. The counter-argument implies that such a 
policy would only fuel resentments against the taboos of the 
establishment, and enhance the potential for right wing vio­
lence. Hence it advocates consciously developing patriotism and 
national pride in Order to occupy the space which would other­
wise be left free for extremist groups of the radical right. 
This counter-argument deserves serious consideration. The 
question then is how we can decide who is right. Scholars who 
are more impressed by Popper than by Feyerabend should think of 
ways to discriminate empirically between rival hypotheses. There 
are at least three ways that would help us to find out which of 
·
-

15 
the two arguments is more compatible with the empirical facts. 
3.1 Political agenda setting and monthly attitude change 
A first way to test the rival hypotheses could consist of a 
time-series analysis that would relate the monthly changes in 
attitudes towards foreigners to preceding attempts of the 
political elites to put the problem of immigration on' the 
political agenda. German poli~ makers have frequently voiced 
their concern over the excessive influx of asylum seekers. The 
letter mailed by CDU-secretary Volker Ruhe to the party's office 
holders is only one of several examples. If my hypothesis is 
correct, we should find an increase in anti-foreign sentiments 
following such activities on the part of politicians. The 
counter hypothesis would predict, in contrast, that radical 
right wing views decline once the political elites prove that 
they are responsive to concerns over the excessive immigration. 
As there is a monthly opinion poll - called UPolitbarometer a and 
carried out by the Forschungsgruppe' Wahlen - it should be 
possible to administer this test. 
I 
3.2 Regional distribution of anti-foreign violence 
A second way to test the rival hypotheses could consist in an 
analysis of the regional distribution of anti-foreign violence. 
My hypothesis suggests that anti-foreign violence is concen­
trated in regions where there is a favorable context for the 
development of neutralization techniques that allow the per­
petrators to deny any guilt. Hence anti-foreign violence should 
predominantly occur in regions with a high proportion of immi­
grants, with high unemployment, and with a local political 
center that is occupied by conservative and patriotic political 
elites who do not ostentatiously de-legitimate excessive natio­
nalism. Holding the first two factors constant, anti-foreign 
violence should be lower where the local center is occupied by 
liberal forces of a cosmopolitan outlook who actively engage in 
promoting solidarity with' foreigners. The counter hypothesis 
would imply just the opposite dfstribution, with violence con­
centrated in liberal areas. Data that allow to pursue this 
strategy of hypothesis testing are available from the study 
commissioned by the Ministry of Women and Youth which has the 
records of more than a thousand suspects who participated in 
anti-foreign violence. 
3.3 Target groups of anti-foreign violence 
A third strategy, finally I could consist in exarrun~ng which 
groups became the targets of ,right wing violence. The counter 
hypothesis would predict that violent acts are not heavily con­
centrated on a specific group of foreigners, since taboos of the 
political establishment can be violated regardless of which 
group is made the target of aggression. My hypothesis, in con­
trast, would ~redict that the violent acts are targeted on those 
groups of foreigners to which the greatest social distance is 
16 
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felt. As we have data on the perception of foreigners by natio-, 
nality, this hypothesis can be subjected to a first preliminary 
test. . 
In his study ·Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen" (1991), Erwin K. 
Scheuch showed the Germans to feel most distant from Turks and 
non-white asylum seekers ,and to direct ,most· anti-foreign resent­
ment against these groups (Scheuch1991: 167). So far Turks and 
asylum seekers have also been the groups on which anti-foreign 
violence has been heavily concentrated (see e.g. the account of 
fatal assaults in DIE WOCHE 24/1993). Thus there seems to be a 
rather strong association between the image of foreigners and 
the targeting of violent acts. This suggests that anti-foreign 
violence is not primarily aimed at violating taboos of the 
political establishment, but indeed an expression of xenophobia' 
that focusses on those specific groups of 
Germans feel the greatest social distance. 
immigrants to which 
In terms of policy making, this analysis implies that German 
politicians have so far seen anti-foreign violence too exclu­
sively from a perspective focussing on the wave of foreign immi­
gration:The data presented here suggest instead that the core 
of the problem is less related to the mere quantitative facts of 
migration, but rather of a political nature. Anti-foreign senti­
ments' do not automatically f<::>llow immigration, but grow in a 
specific political climate which the political elites can 
actively influence. 
t' 
.I 
I 
. 17 

References 
Abba Eban, 1970: Dies ist mein Volk. Die Geschichte der Juden. 
Munchen/Zur:ich: Droeme.rsche Verlagsanstalt. 
Barabas, G./Gieseck, A./Heilemann, U./von Loeffelholz, A., 1992: 
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte der Zuwanderung 1988 bis 1991. 
RWl-Mitteilungen. Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsforschung 43: 133­
154. 
Baratta, M. von (Hrsg.), 1992: Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1993. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. 
Beck, M., 1992a: Sozialhilfeaufwand 1990. Wirtschaft und Stati­
stik 44: 30-34. 
Beck, M., 1992b: Sozialhilfeaufwand 1991. Wirtschaft und Stati­
stik 44: 891-826 . 
Beck, M., 1992c: Sozialhilfeempfanger 1990. Wirtschaft und Sta­
tistik 44: 299-310. 
Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1991: Arbeits­
und Sozialstatistik. Hauptergebnisse 1991. Bonn. 
Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1992a: Stati­
stisches Taschenbuch 1992. Bonn. 
Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1992b: Arbeits­
und Sozialstatistik. Hauptergebnisse 1992. Bonn. 
Bundesministerium fur Arbeit undSozialordnung, 1993: Auslander­
Daten. Bonn. 
Bundesinnenministerium des lnnern, 1993: Verfassungsschutzbe­
richt 1992. ~onn. 
Bundesministerium des lnnern, 1992 etc.: Verfassungsschutzbe­
richt 1991 (und fruhere Ausgaben 1980-1988). Bonn. 
Consulat General de France, 1993: Rapport 1992 sur la lutte 
contre Ie racisme en France et l'antisemitisme (zugestellt mit 
Schreiben vom 28 ..10.1993) . 
. Deininger, D., 1983: Sozialhilfeempfanger 1981. Wirtschaft und 
Statistik 35,6: 505-511. 
Der Spiegel, 1993:. TUrken in Deutschland: 'Menschen zweiter 
Klasse 23: 16-29. 
Deutscher Bundestag, 1991: Jahresgutachten 1991/92 des Sach­
verstandigenrates zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
~ntwicklung., DrucK~ache 12/1615. Bonn. 
18 
·­
/
/ 
Deutscher Bundestag, 1992: Jahresgutachten1992/93 des Sach­
verstandigenrates zur Begutachtung der g,esamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung. Drucksache 12/3774., Bonn. 
Elias, N., 1990: Studien Uber die Deutschen: Machtkampfe und 
Habitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert I 4. Auflage. 
Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Fuchs, D./Gerhards, J./Roller, E., 1993: Wir und die Anderen. 
Ethnozentrismus in den zwOlf Landern der Europaischen Gemein­
schaft. KOlner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 
45: 238-253. 
Graziani, R., 1992: Neue Konzeptionen der lntegrationspolitik 
fur auslandische Arbeitskrafte. Universitat Konstanz: Diplomar-' 
beit. 
Habich, R./Headey, B./Krause, P" 1991: Armut im Reichtum - lst 
die Bundesrepublik eine Zwei-Drittel-Gesellschaft.? S. 488-509 
in: U. Rendte/G. Wagner (Hrsg.), Lebenslagen im Wandel: Zur 
Einkommensdynamik in Deutschland seit 1984. Frankfurt/New York: 
Campus. 
Home Office, 1993: Fax vom 9.12.1993. 
ipos (lnstitut fur praxisorientierte Sozialforschung), 1993: 
Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene in Deutschland. Mannheim. 
Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell (Hrsg.), 1992: Jugend '92. Die 
neuen Lander: Ruckblick und Perspektiven. Opladen': Leske + Bud-
rich.' . 
Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 1992: Eurobarometer 
Nr. 37. Brussel. . 
Korczak, D., 1992: Uberschuldungssituation und Schuldnerberatung 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland- Studie im Auf trag des Bun­
desministeriums fur Familie und Senioren und des Bundesministe­
riums der Justiz. Band 3 der Sch~iftenreihe des Bundesministe­
riums fur Familie und Senioren. Stuttgart. 
Krause, P., 1992: Einkommensarmut in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch­
land.,Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B49: 3-17. 
Lepsius, M. R./Ludz, P. C./Scholz, R., 1974: Nation. S. 1-154 
in: Bundesministerium fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen (Hrsg.), 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Deutsche demokratische Republik. 
Systemvergleich 3. Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation. 
Berlin. ' 
Mayer, H. -L., 1991: Wahlerverhalten bei der Bundestagswahl 1990 
nach Geschlecht und Alter. Ergebnis der reprasentativen Wahlsta­
tistik. Wirtschaft und Statistik 43: 248-260. 
Mayer, K.-U., 1975: Ungleichheit und'Mobilitat im sozialen Be­
wuBtsein. Untersuchunge~ zur Definition der Mobilitatssituation. 
19 ·. 
/ 
/. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Neumann, F., 1977: Behemoth: Struktur und'Praxis des National­
sozialismus 1933-1944. KOln/Frankfurt a.M.: Europaische Ver­
lagsanstalt. 
Noelle-Neumann, E./KOcher, R. (Hrsg), 1993: Allensbacher Jahr­
buch der Demoskopie 1984-1992. MUnchen u.a.: K.G. Sauro 
Rehfeld, U.: 1991: Auslandische Arbeitnehmer und Rentner in der 
gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung. Deutsche Rentenversicherung 7: 
468-492. 
Roth, Dieter, 1989: Sind die Republikaner die flinfte Partei? Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte 41/42: 10-20. 
Scheuch, Erwin K., 1991: Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen? Eine 
Nation wandelt ihr Gesicht. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lubbe. 
Schwedische Botschaft, 1993: Fax vom 16.9.1993. 
Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1992: Extremismus in der Schweiz. 
Bericht des Bundesrates zum Extremismus in der Schweiz. Bern. 
Shils, E. A., 1965: Charisma, Order, and Status. American 
Sociological Review 30: 199-213. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1991: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die 
Bund~srepublik Deutschland 1991. Wiesbaden: Metzler-Poeschel. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 1992a: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1992. Wiesbaden: Metzler-Poeschel. 
Statistisches' Bundesamt, 1992b: Datenreport 1992. Zahlen und 
Fakten uber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn. 
Steinke, Wolfgang, 1993: Rechtsxtremismus. Ein Blick auf die 
Lage in Europa und den USA. Kriminalisitik 8-9: 507-508. 
Svenska Institutet, 1993: Immigrants in Sweden. Fact Sheets on 
Sweden. Stockholm.' 
Sykes, G. M./Matza, D., 1957: Techniques of Neutralization: A 
Theory of Delinquency. American Sociological Review 22: 664-670. 
Weber, M., 1980: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage. 
TUbingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
Wiegand, E., 1993: Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der Festung Europa. 
Einstellungzu Fremden im europaischen Vergleich, S. 1-4 in: lSI 
Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren, Nr. 9. Mannheim: Zentrum 
fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA}e.V. 
Willems, H./Wurtz, S./Eckert, R., 1993: Fremdenfeindliche Ge­
walt: Eine Analyse von Taterstruktu.ren uno Eskalation:sproze:s:sen. 
Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums fur Frauen 
20 
·
. 
und Jugend und der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft 
Zetterberg,' H. L. I 1957: Compliant Actions', Acta Sociologica 2: 
179-201 . 
./ 
/ 
I 
I • 
Table 1: Asylum seekers and right wing deliuquenc:y in Germany 
/ 
Year Asylum 
seekers 
Right wing violence Right
wing 
delin­
quency 
No of violent acts Violent 
acts 
per 
1000. 
asylum 
seekers 
No of 
del in­
quent 
acts 
GERMANY Total East Germany Ratio 
N N N % N 
1993 322842 1814 . . . 25 5.62 ... 
1992 438191 2584 865 33 5.90 7121 
1991 256112 1483 4.93 33 5.79 3884 
1990 193063 270 • • 4 • .. 1.40 1848 
OLD FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
1990 193063 128 0.66 1380 
1989 121318 103 0.85 1853 
1988 10307"6 73 0.71 1607 
1987 57379 76 1.32 1447 
1986 99"650 71 0.71. 1281 
1985 73832 69 0.93 1569 
1984 35278 83 2.35 1714 
1983 19737 67 3.39 2169 
1982 37423 53 1.42 2475 
1981 49391 92 1.86 1824 
1980 107818 113 1. 05 1643 
1979 97 1483 
1978 992 
1977 616 
1976 319 
1975 206 
1974 136 
~: BundemliDisterium des lDDerD: V~chte 1992" 1991. 1990, 1988. 1987. 1985. 1983. 1981. 1980; Der Bundes· 
IIliDislcr fiit Albeit UDd SOiiih:rdaUII,: AllsliDdcr-Dateu (1993 - fex asylum seekers 19!)O.1992); Siiddeutscbe Zeitlmg DO 1011994: 6 (for 
vio1eut a.c:ts 1993) aud DO 411994: 6 (for asylum seekm 1993); DER SPIEGEL 46Il992: 41 (fex asylum seekers 1980-1990). 
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Graph 1: Attitudes towards non nationals of the EC 1992 
(presence, in one's country, of peoille coming from non-EC countrIes) 
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Graph 2: Attitudes towards rights of immigrants in the EC 1992 
(Extend or restrict) 
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Graph 3: Attitudes towards accepting foreign asylum seekers 1992 
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Graph 4: Attitudes towards foreigners' right to vote in local elections 1992 
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Graph 5: Attitudes towards foreigners 1992 
(Compound index of rejection) 
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Graph 6: Asylum seekers and anti-foreign violence in Germany 
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Graph 7: Right wing violence in Germany 
(,'Iolent acts per 1000 asylum seekers) 
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